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In January  2020,  Austria  publicly  announced  that  some  of its  governmental
institutions have been hit  by a significant malicious cyber  operation and that  it
cannot be denied – at least for the moment – that a state was behind this operation.
One month later, the Austrian Foreign Ministry declared the cyber operation to be
officially  over.  While  Austria  noted  that  it  took  “countermeasures”  against
the operation, it is not entirely clear what it meant by that. This article elaborates
the question  what  response  options  a state  like  Austria  would  have  against
a malicious cyber operation under the current framework of international law. It,
hence, tries to answer when a “hackback” is lawful under international law and
when it is not.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In January  2020,  Austria  publicly  announced  that  the Austrian  Foreign
Ministry has been hit by a significant malicious cyber operation and that it
cannot be denied – at least for the moment1 – that a state was behind this
operation.2 In February  2020,  the Foreign  Ministry  declared  the malicious
operation  to be  officially  over.3 While  Austria  noted  that  it  took
“countermeasures”  (“Gegenmaßnahmen”)4 it  is  not  entirely  clear  what  it
meant by that. According to an Austrian blog, technicians managed to get
rid of the malware, putting the hacking group “in the defensive”.5  There is
no  further  information  available  whether  Austria  considered  response
options under international law. This leads us to the question what a state –
in this case Austria – could do (or could have done) in such a case, i.e. what
measures would be allowed under the current framework of international
law.  This  contribution,  therefore,  seeks  to shine  light  on the specific
reactions  international  law  allows  a state  in case  it  was  injured
by a wrongful  conduct,  specifically  with  respect  to wrongful  cyber
operations. It will, hence, try to answer when a “hackback” is lawful under
international law and when it is not.  
This contribution defines “hackback” as a measure taken through “cyber
means” by a state against the territory of another state to cease a wrongful
conduct  (in the form  of a cyber  operation)  the former  state  has  been
the target of. At the outset, this means that this contribution does not cover
questions  regarding  possible  measures  of redress  of non-state  actors  that
have been the target of malicious cyber operations. 
1 In a press release, the Austrian Foreign Ministry noted that “the investigation is still ongoing”
about  who  is  behind  the “attack”,  see  Austrian  Federal  Ministry  for  European  and
International  Affairs.  (2020)  Cyber  Attack  on the Foreign  Ministry  is  Over.  [press  release]
13 February. Available from: www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/announcements/2020/
02/cyber-attack-on-the-foreign-ministry-is-over/ [Accessed 19 August 2020].
2 Austrian Press Agency. (2020) Schwerwiegender Angriff auf IT-Systeme des Außenministeriums.
[press release] 4 January. Available from: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_2020
0104_OTS0020/schwerwiegender-angriff-auf-it-systeme-des-aussenministeriums  
[Accessed 19 August 2020].
3 Austrian  Federal  Ministry  for  European  and  International  Affairs.  (2020)  Cyber  Attack
on the Foreign Ministry is Over. [press release] 13 February. Available from: www.bmeia.gv.
at/en/the-ministry/press/announcements/2020/02/cyber-attack-on-the-foreign-ministry-is-
over/ [Accessed 19 August 2020].
4 Ibid.
5 Moechel, E. (2020)  Vorläufige Bilanz des Cyberangriffs auf das Außenministerium. [blog entry]
16 February. Radio FM4. Available from: https://fm4.orf.at/stories/2998771/ 
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
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This  paper  will  first  address  the concept  of attribution  of a wrongful
conduct  to a state  and  briefly  introduce  the reader  to the so-called  “due
diligence  principle”.  In a second  step,  it  will  analyse  three  ways
international  law  allows  a reaction  (hackback)  to a malicious  cyber
operation  endangering  a state’s  territorial  integrity:  1)  as a lawful
countermeasure,  2)  as an exercise  of the right  of self-defence,
or 3) as a reaction out of necessity. Given that most cyber operations happen
below  the threshold  of an armed  attack6 (only  in case  of the latter  would
a state  be  able  to respond  in self-defence7),  it  makes  sense  to take  a look
at countermeasures  first  before  addressing  self-defensive  measures.
“Necessity”  as a response  option  should  be  seen  as a last  resort,  given
the high  threshold  and  non-reliance  on attribution  (on these  criteria,  see
in detail below). Hence it will be dealt with last.
There are many open questions related to these three measures that we
cannot  all  cover  in this  paper.  One,  for  example,  would  relate
to the extensive  debate  about  the application of international  law to cyber
operations, and whether some provisions apply or do not apply in the cyber
context.  For  the purpose  of this  contribution,  we  align  with  the larger
international community and scholarly opinion that the conventional rules
of international law (be it treaty obligations, general principles or custom)
apply  to cyber  operations.8 We  also  assume  that  measures  taken in self-
-defence as well as countermeasures can only be taken against a state and
that the initial malicious cyber operation would have to be attributed to that
state.9 Since that latter aspect of attribution is a conditio sine qua non  of two
6 Guitton,  C.  (2017)  Inside  the Enemy’s  Computer:  Identifying  Cyber-Attackers.  London: Hurst
& Company, p. 107.
7 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945
(1 UNTS XVI). Article 51.
8 With  UNGA  Resolution  68/243,  the international  community  endorsed  the 2013  Report
of the Group  of Governmental  Experts  on Developments  in the Field  of Information  and
Telecommunications in the Context  of International  Security  (GGE),  which acknowledges
that  “international  law,  and  in particular  the Charter  of the United  Nations,  is  applicable”;  see
United  Nations  General  Assembly.  (2014)  Developments  in the Field  of Information  and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. UN Doc A/RES/68/243. New York:
United  Nations.  [online] Available  from:  https://undocs.org/A/RES/68/243  [Accessed
20 August 2020]; United Nations General Assembly. (2013)  Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments  in the Field  of Information  and  Telecommunications  in the Context
of International  Security:  Note  by the Secretary-General.  UN Doc A/68/98. New York:  United
Nations. Paragraph 19.  [online] Available from: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN
DOC/GEN/N13/371/66/PDF/N1337166.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 20 August 2020].
9 To the contrary see, however, Zemanek, K. (2013) Armed Attack. In: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.).
Max  Planck  Encyclopedia  of Public  International  Law  (online  edition),  paragraph  15;
Tsagourias, N. (2012) Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution.  Journal
of Conflict and Security Law, 17, p. 241.
230 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 14:2
of the three measures that we will focus on in this contribution, we will start
with discussing it first.
2. ATTRIBUTION AND DUE DILIGENCE
Attribution,  in  general,  is  the act  of “identifying  the agent  responsible  for
the action”.10 Usually, experts differentiate between technical,  political  and
legal attribution.11 All three aspects of attribution need to be seriously taken
into account when undertaking a hackback.
Regarding  technical  attribution,  identifying  the person  acting  behind
the computer  is  extremely  difficult.12 The high  degree  of anonymity
in the cyber context, the possibilities of conducting false-flag operations and
the difficulties  to identify  the actors  behind  multi-stage  attacks  make  it
almost  impossible  to distinguish  a particular  actor  in cyberspace.13
However,  identifying  the specific  natural  person  and  its  relationship
to a state  is  the quintessential  prerequisite  of legal  attribution.14 Because
only if a relationship with a state can be established, the targeted state can
take action against the state from which the unlawful conduct originates.
For  legal  attribution,  the ILC  Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for
Internationally  Wrongful  Acts  (hereinafter  referred  to  as ILC  Articles)  are
the primary  source  to determine  whose  conduct  can  be  attributed
10 Clark, D. D. and Landau, S. (2011) Untangling Attribution. Harvard National Security Journal,
2, p. 1.
11 Nicholas  Tsagourias  is  deemed to be  the author  of this  differentiation,  see  Tsagourias,  N.
(2012)  Cyber Attacks,  Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution.  Journal  of Conflict  and
Security  Law,  17,  p. 234:  “Attribution  of cyber  attacks  is  thus  a multifaceted  process;  it  has
technical, legal and political aspects, with each aspect feeding into the other”; see also Government
of the Netherlands.  (2019)  Appendix  to the Letter  to the Parliament  on the International  Legal
Order in Cyberspace. The Hague,  p. 6. [online] Available from: https://www.government.nl/
documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-
international-legal-order-in-cyberspace  [Accessed  4  February  2020]:  “In the context
of cyberspace, three forms of attribution can be distinguished: Technical attribution  […], Political
attribution [… and] Legal attribution […]”.
12 Antonopoulos, C. (2015) State Responsibility  in Cyberspace. In: Nicholas Tsagourias and
Russell  Buchan (eds.).  Research Handbook on International  Law and Cyberspace.  Cheltenham
and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 62.
13 Brunner,  I.,  Dobric,  M.  and  Pirker,  V.  (2019)  Proving  a State’s  Involvement  in a Cyber-
Attack:  Evidentiary  Standards  Before  the ICJ.  Finnish  Yearbook  of International  Law,  25,
pp. 76–77.
14 See Antonopoulos,  C.  (2015)  State  Responsibility  in Cyberspace.  In:  Nicholas Tsagourias
and  Russell  Buchan  (eds.).  Research  Handbook  on International  Law  and  Cyberspace.
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 58.
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to a state.15 The rules  of attribution  contained  therein  are  widely  held
to reflect customary international law.16
The ILC Articles follow their own legal definition of attribution, which
they define as 
“the operation of attaching a given action or omission to a State.”17
For  that,  the ILC  Articles  distinguish  between  conduct  of state  organs
(including  de facto  state organs)18,  and conduct  of non-state actors,  who –
in one way or the other – act for the state.19 Thus, if there is no sufficient link
between the natural  person or group of persons and the state,  attribution
on the basis  of the ILC  Articles –  which  regulate  the consequences
of wrongful state behaviour – cannot be established. 
However, as already noted above, the difficulty does not lie in the legal
realm,  it  lies  within  proving  the sufficient  link  to the state:  If a cyber
operation originates from an IP address situated within the territory of state
A, this information still  does not provide us with which actor is actually
behind the wrongful  cyber  operation.  With its  press  release  of 4  January
2020, Austria seems to suggest that it was indeed able to identify the origins
of the “attack”.20 Unfortunately,  however,  it  did  not  release  any  further
information –  let  alone  evidence –  that  would  back  up  its  position  that
a state actor could be behind the operation.
Given  the fact  that  attribution  of a wrongful  conduct  to a state  tends
to be  very  difficult,  some  scholars  suggest  to apply  the so-called  “due
diligence”  principle  also  in the cyber  context:  If a direct  link  to a state
cannot be established, but it can be proven that the cyber operation derives
15 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10. [online] Available from: https://legal.un.
org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
16 See e.g. Antonopoulos, C. (2015) State Responsibility in Cyberspace. In: Tsagourias, N. and
Buchan, R. (eds.).  Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace. Cheltenham and
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 58.
17 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10.  P.  36  (Commentary  to Article  2,
paragraph  12).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
18 Cf. op. cit., Article 4.
19 Cf. op. cit., Articles 5, 8 and 11.
20 Austrian Press Agency. (2020) Schwerwiegender Angriff auf IT-Systeme des Außenministeriums.
[press release] 4 January. Available from: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_2020
0104_OTS0020/schwerwiegender-angriff-auf-it-systeme-des-aussenministeriums  
[Accessed 19 August 2020].
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from a specific location on the territory of another state, state responsibility
should  arise  on the basis  that  that  other  State  violated  its  due  diligence
obligation.21 Here, it must be highlighted that the state can merely be held
responsible  for  acting  negligently,  not  for  the initial  malicious  cyber
operation itself.22
The “due diligence principle” was most famously referred to in the Corfu
Channel judgment of the ICJ, which notes that it is
“every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States”.23
Therefore, this means that states cannot escape international responsibility
by merely noting that they did not do it if they knew that malicious conduct
was  exercised  through  some  (non-state  or foreign  state)  actor  on their
territory.  They  can  thus  at least  be  held  responsible  for  knowing  about
the malicious conduct and not taking appropriate action to counter it.
Some scholars suggest that this principle constitutes a general principle
of (international) law,24 which also applies to cyber activities.25 Both Tallinn
Manuals26 have included a due diligence  rule similar  to the Corfu Channel
dictum.27 Along  the same  lines,  Recommendation  13(c)  of the 2015  Report
of the United  Nations  Group  of Governmental  Experts  on Developments
21 Cf. Henriksen, A. (2015) Lawful State Responses to Low-Level Cyber-Attacks. Nordic Journal
of International  Law,  84 (2),  p. 335;  we  have  not  seen  Austria  claim  a violation  of “due
diligence” (yet).
22 There is a suggestion in the literature, however, that a state should be held responsible for
the initial  act  if it  acted  negligently,  see,  inter  alia,  Chircop,  L.  (2018)  A Due  Diligence
Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 67, p. 643.
There is no basis in international law, however, which would support such an argument.
23 Judgment of 9 April 1949, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania) (Merits), ICJ Reports 4,
p. 22;  The due  diligence  principle  is  said  to have  its  origins  in the Island  of Palmas
Arbitration, which notes the following: “Territorial sovereignty […] involves the exclusive right
to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within
the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace
and in war”,  see Award of 4 April  1928,  Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States
of America), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, Vol. II, p. 839.
24 See  Bannelier-Christakis,  K.  (2014)  Cyber  Diligence:  A Low-Intensity  Due  Diligence
Principle  for  Low-Intensity  Cyber  Operations?.  Baltic  Yearbook  of International  Law,  14,
pp. 23, 27; Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30; Koivurova, T.
(2010)  Due  Diligence.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum  (ed.).  Max  Planck  Encyclopedia  of Public
International Law  (online edition), paragraph 2 (Bannelier-Christakis  and the Tallinn Manual
2.0 call  it  a general  principle  of international  law,  Koivurova  calls  it  a general  principe
of law).
25 Schmitt,  M.  N.  (2015)  In Defense  of Due  Diligence  in Cyberspace.  The Yale  Law  Journal
Forum,  125,  p. 68;  Bannelier-Christakis,  K.  (2014)  Cyber  Diligence:  A Low-Intensity  Due
Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?. Baltic Yearbook of International Law,
14, p. 27; Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 31.
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in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security (hereinafter referred to as UNGGE)28 notes that
“States  should  not  knowingly  allow  their  territory  to be  used  for
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs [Information and Communication
Technologies]”.29
This is significant, as the report reflects the opinion of governmental – and
thus states’ – experts on the application of international law to cyberspace.
It is important to note, however, that the reference in the report is merely
framed as a non-binding recommendation.30 This suggests that it is far from
clear  that  this  principle  is a stand-alone  principle  inducing  obligations
on states “in its own right” in the cyber context.31 Austria has made it clear
that  it  perceives  the due  diligence  obligation  to be  “a legally  binding
obligation  under  international  law”.32 Given  that  we  seek  to shine  light
26 Both  Tallinn Manual 1.0  and  2.0  provide guidance for policy advisors and governmental
legal experts on how international law applies to cyberspace. They contain cyber specific
rules, which were agreed upon by an international group of experts and have been written
under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
27 Schmitt,  M. N. (ed.).  (2013)  The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable  to Cyber
Warfare.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University  Press,  p. 26,  Rule  5,  stipulates  that  “[a] State
shall  not  knowingly  allow the cyber  infrastructure  located  in its  territory  or under  its  exclusive
governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other States”; Schmitt,
M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30, Rule 6, stipulates that “[a] State
must exercise due diligence in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infra-structure under
its governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious
adverse consequences for, other States”.
28 The UNGGE  is  a group of governmental  experts  tasked with,  inter  alia,  identifying  how
international  law applies  in cyberspace.  It  convened 5 times  since 2004 and is  currently
convening for the 6th time until 2021.
29 United  Nations  General  Assembly.  (2015)  Group  of Governmental  Experts  on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Note
by the Secretary-General.  UN GAOR 70th  Session,  Item 93,  UN Doc A/70/174.  New  York:
United Nations, p. 8, paragraph 13(c).  [online] Available from: https://undocs.org/A/70/174
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
30 United  Nations  General  Assembly.  (2015)  Group  of Governmental  Experts  on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Note
by the Secretary-General.  UN GAOR 70th  Session,  Item 93,  UN Doc A/70/174.  New  York:
United Nations, p. 8, paragraph 13.
31 The Netherlands, e.g. “regard the principle as an obligation in its own right, the violation of which
may constitute an internationally wrongful act”, but they also acknowledge that not all states
share  this  view;  see  Government  of the Netherlands.  (2019)  Appendix  to the Letter
to the Parliament  on the International  Legal  Order  in Cyberspace.  The Hague,  p. 4.  [online]
Available from: https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/
26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace  
[Accessed 4 February 2020].
32 Government  of Austria.  (2020)  Austrian  Statement  on Rules,  Norms  and  Principles  for
Responsible  State  Behaviour,  p.  2  (delivered  on 17  June  at the Informal  OEWG  June
Consultations).
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on Austria’s  perspective  and also  because  we  are  convinced  that  this  is
the right decision, we will follow this assumption.
Next  to that,  there  are  a couple  of other  questions  regarding
the application of this principle to cyber operations:
Firstly,  as the due  diligence  principle  is  an obligation  of conduct,  not
result,33 the content of the obligation needs to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.34 For  example,  there  seem  to be  differing  views  whether  this
obligation also contains an obligation to prevent.35 While the Tallinn Manual
2.0 notes that its experts agreed that
“the due  diligence  principle  does  not  encompass  an obligation  to take
material preventive steps”,36
other scholars disagree. Bannelier-Christakis, for example, notes that the due
diligence principle indeed also encompasses a duty of prevention.37 Thus, it
is not clear what kind of obligations are expected in the cyber context from
each state in a given case.38
Secondly,  questions  remain  regarding  the knowledge  requirement
of the due diligence principle.  On the one hand, how can an injured state
prove that a state had knowledge about a specific cyber operation? It could
be  argued  that  as that  latter  state  exercises  exclusive  control  over  its
territory,  it  will  be  almost  impossible  for  the injured  state  to establish
enough  evidence  that  that  state  knew  about  the situation.39 On the other
hand,  does  “constructive  knowledge”  (i.e. the state  should have  known
33 Bannelier-Christakis,  K. (2014) Cyber Diligence:  A Low-Intensity Due Diligence Principle
for  Low-Intensity  Cyber  Operations?.  Baltic  Yearbook  of International  Law,  14,  p. 26;
Koivurova,  T. (2010) Due Diligence.  In: Rüdiger  Wolfrum (ed.).  Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public  International Law (online edition), paragraph 8; Schmitt,  M. and Vihul, L. (eds.).
(2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 49.
34 See Kolb, R. (2015) Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace.  German Yearbook
of International  Law,  58,  p. 116:  “[D]ue  diligence  is  a standard  of care,  a general  clause,  not
a specific rule to be immediately applied; it requires a judgement of value of what could and should
have reasonably be done under the circumstances [… It] is a relative and circumstantial term, since
the judgement on it must take account of all the circumstances of the particular case; judgment thus
always takes place in concreto; the judgment is also necessarily flexible”.
35 See  Bannelier-Christakis,  K.  (2014)  Cyber  Diligence:  A Low-Intensity  Due  Diligence
Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?. Baltic Yearbook of International Law, 14, p. 32;
Kolb,  R.  (2015)  Reflections  on Due  Diligence  Duties  and  Cyberspace.  German  Yearbook
of International Law, 58, p. 123; on the other hand, denying a duty of prevention, see Schmitt,
M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32.
36 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 32, paragraph 5.
37 Bannelier-Christakis,  K. (2014) Cyber Diligence:  A Low-Intensity Due Diligence Principle
for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?. Baltic Yearbook of International Law, 14, pp. 23, 30.
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about the situation) suffice in order to claim a violation of the due diligence
principle? Here, again, there seem to be diverging views.40
While Austria seems convinced of the principle’s binding nature, it has
not  (yet)  clarified  its  view  on the specific  questions  raised  above.  It  has,
however,  endorsed  South  Korea’s  proposal  on the implementation
of Recommendation 13(c) of the 2015 GGE Report  in its statement in June 2020
at informal consultations of the OEWG, noting that
“a state  which  has  been  notified  by another  state  about  an ICT  incident
on its territory and has thus knowledge about it must take all reasonable
steps to cease the incident and mitigate its adverse consequences for other
states.”41
To conclude,  the due  diligence  principle  appears  to be  a useful  tool
to establish responsibility for those acts which occurred on a state’s territory
and of whose harmful nature the state knew about. Austria itself  has not
made use of this principle for the January 2020 incident. However, if a state
succeeds  in establishing  the responsibility  of another  state  for  a malicious
38 France,  the Netherlands  and  Estonia  advocate  a “reasonability  test”,  but  do  not  specify
what can be seen as “reasonable” and what not; see Ministère des Armées. (2019)  Droit
International  Appliqué  Aux Operations  Dans  Le  Cyberespace.  Paris,  p. 10.  [online] Available
from: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministe
re-des-armees/communique_la-france-s-engage-a-promouvoir-un-cyberespace-stable-fonde
-sur-la-confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-international  [Accessed  4  February  2020];
Government  of the Netherlands.  (2019)  Appendix  to the Letter  to the Parliament
on the International  Legal  Order  in Cyberspace.  The Hague,  p. 4.  [online] Available  from:
https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-
parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace  [Accessed  4  February  2020];
Government of Estonia. (2019) President of the Republic at the Opening of CyCon 2019. Tallinn.
[online] Available  from:  https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-
president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html [Accessed 20 August
2020].
39 Bannelier-Christakis,  K. (2014) Cyber Diligence:  A Low-Intensity Due Diligence Principle
for  Low-Intensity  Cyber  Operations?.  Baltic  Yearbook  of International  Law,  14,  p. 29,  who
terms this a “probatio diabolica”.
40 See e.g. Schmitt,  M. N. (ed.).  (2013)  The Tallinn  Manual  on the International  Law Applicable
to Cyber  Warfare.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  p. 28,  paragraph  11:
“The International  Group  of Experts  could  not  achieve  consensus  as whether  this  rule  applies
if the respective  State  has  only  constructive  (‘should  have  known’)  knowledge” ;  see,  however,
Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber  Operations.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  p. 41,  which  says  that
“[t]he International Group of Experts agreed that knowledge encompasses constructive knowledge
for the purposes of this Rule”; see also Bannelier-Christakis, K. (2014) Cyber Diligence: A Low-
-Intensity  Due  Diligence  Principle  for  Low-Intensity  Cyber  Operations?.  Baltic  Yearbook
of International Law, 14, pp. 29f, arguing in favour of the “constructive knowledge” theory;
see  also  Kolb,  R.  (2015)  Reflections  on Due  Diligence  Duties  and  Cyberspace.  German
Yearbook of International Law, 58, pp. 123–124.
41 Government  of Austria.  (2020)  Austrian  Statement  on Rules,  Norms  and  Principles  for
Responsible  State  Behaviour,  p. 2  (delivered  on 17  June  at the Informal  OEWG  June
Consultations).
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cyber operation – be it  through attributing the wrongful conduct  directly
to the state  or through  proving  the state’s  violation  of the due  diligence
principle,  the question  now  is  how  the targeted  state  can  react  to it.
As explained above, international law allows specific measures. 
In principle, in the case of countermeasures and measures taken in self-
-defence the targeted  State  must  know  who is  the perpetrator
of the wrongful  act  (note,  that  in case  of a violation  of the due  diligence
principle, the wrongfulness relates to the state acting in negligence, and not
in committing the wrongful act itself).   
Thus,  we will  first  start  with addressing countermeasures (as the least
“intervention-intensive” measure),  followed by self-defense  and end with
the measure for which attribution to a state is not necessary: the exceptional
plea of necessity.
3. HACKBACK AS A COUNTERMEASURE
A state  may  take  a countermeasure  against  a state  who  has  committed
an internationally wrongful act, in order to induce the state to comply with
its international obligations.42 These countermeasures would be, in general,
unlawful,  if they were  not  undertaken as a reactive  measure  to the initial
wrongful act.43 Thus, in order to take a countermeasure, the initial act must
be in violation of international law. 
Countermeasures need to be distinguished from retorsions:  Retorsions
are lawful, but unfriendly acts, whereas countermeasures are unlawful acts,
42 See UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International  Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10. Article 49. [online] Available from:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf  
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
43 See UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International  Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 128 (Commentary to Part Three,
Chapter II, paragraph 1). [online] Available from: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf  [Accessed  20  August  2020];  note  that  if a state
wrongfully assumes that, let’s say, state A was behind an operation and takes a counter-
-measure  against  state  A,  but  it  turns  out  that  state  B  was  actually  behind  the  act,
the injured state has committed an internationally wrongful act whose wrongfulness would
not be precluded; see UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International
Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With
Commentaries. UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 130 (Commentary
to Article  49,  paragraph  3).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
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whose unlawfulness is, however, precluded if they are a reaction to another
violation of international law.44
In the context  of hackbacks,  three  violations  are  of particular  interest:
1) the violation  of the prohibition  to use  force,  2)  the violation
of the prohibition  of intervention  and  3)  the violation  of the rule
of sovereignty  [in case  one  assumes  that  this  is  a stand-alone  rule
of international  law applicable  in cyberspace.45 Austria  has  made  it  clear
in its  speech  on international  law  at the February  session  of the so-called
Open-Ended  Working  Group  on Developments  in the Field  of Information  and
Telecommunications  in the Context  of International  Security (hereinafter
referred  to as OEWG) that  it  believes  that  it  is  a rule,  and  not  merely
a principle, and also suggested that the cyber operation against the Foreign
Ministry might be a violation of sovereignty46]. Other works have dealt with
these  questions  in detail,  thus  the focus  of this  paper  is  on the reactions
to the violation of these primary obligations.47
There are certain procedural and substantive conditions that need to be
fulfilled  in order  for  a state  to be  entitled to undertake a countermeasure.
First  and foremost,  if we  follow the traditional  view on countermeasures
as stipulated by the ILC Articles, they are “non-forcible”48, meaning that any
countermeasure  must  not  cross  the threshold  of use  of force.49 Within
44 See UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 128 (Commentary to Part Three,
Chapter II, paragraph 3). [online] Available from: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
45 To the contrary see the speech by UK Attorney General  Jeremy Wright, noting that there is
no  principle  of sovereignty  in cyberspace.  Wright,  J.  (2018)  Cyber  and  International  Law
in the 21st  Century.  London.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century [Accessed 20 August 2020].
46 See  Government  of Austria.  (2020)  OEWG  on Developments  in the Field  of Information  and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Statement by Austria on International
Law.  New  York,  p. 1  (delivered  on 11  February  at the second  substantive  session
of the OEWG).
47 See e.g. Roscini, M. (2014)  Cyber Operations and the Use of Force. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; Brunner, I., Dobric, M. and Pirker, V. (2019) Proving a State’s Involvement in a Cyber-
-Attack:  Evidentiary  Standards  Before  the  ICJ.  Finnish  Yearbook  of International  Law,  25;
Schmitt,  M.  (2014)  “Below  the  Threshold”  Cyber  Operations:  The Countermeasures
Response Option and International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 54.
48 See UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 129 (Commentary to Part Three,
Chapter II, paragraph 6). [online] Available from: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
49 See op. cit., Article 50(1)(a):  “Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from
the threat  or use  of force  as embodied  in the Charter  of the United  Nations”;  additionally,
countermeasures must also not violate fundamental human rights obligations of the state,
see op. cit., Article 50(1)(b).
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the literature  different  approaches  exist  on how  to determine  what
measures  can  be  considered  “forcible”  and  are  therefore  prohibited
by Article  2(4)  UN  Charter.50 A very  reasonable  approach  by Dinniss  is
to assess whether the act in question resulted in a “physical consequence” –
hence, in “destruction of physical property, injury or loss of lives”.51 In that case,
the act is to be considered a use of force. Schmitt also includes a “serious loss
of functionality”,52 which  is  helpful  in case  a massive  amount  of data  is
deleted  and  can  only  be  recovered  with  great  difficulty  and  immense
technical skill. Otherwise, or when the
“physical  results  are  too  minimal  or too  removed  from  the chain
of causation”,
it  cannot be presumed that Article 2(4) UN Charter is violated.53 If a state
were  thus  to defend  itself  against  DDoS  attacks  without  causing  any
physical  consequences  against  the wrongful  state  (such  as by blocking  IP
addresses  from  which  the attacks  are  held  to originate)  this  will  not
constitute a use of force. 
The Tallinn  Manual  2.0,  on the other  hand,  viewed  the limitation  not
to use force when responding with a countermeasure a “contentious issue”
and thus decided not to address this limitation in a Rule.54 Given the explicit
wording of the ILC Articles, the note in the ILC Articles’ Commentary that
the obligation  to refrain  from  the threat  or use  of force  when  taking
countermeasures is “sacrosanct”,55 and the lack of state practice56 in favour
to digress  from  this  obligation,  we  stick  to the ILC  Articles’  assessment
50 See  Shackelford,  S.  J.,  and  Andres,  R.  B.  (2011)  State  Responsibility  for  Cyber  Attacks:
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem.  Georgetown Journal  of International Law,  42,
p. 993.
51 Dinniss,  H.  (2014)  Cyber  Warfare  and  the Laws of War.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University
Press, p. 74.
52 Schmitt, M. (2020) Cyber Operations Against Vaccine R & D: Key International Law Prohibitions
and Obligations. [blog entry] 10 August. EJIL:Talk!. Available from: www.ejiltalk.org/cyber-
operations-against-vaccine-r-d-key-international-law-prohibitions-and-obligations/
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
53 Dinniss,  H.  (2014)  Cyber  Warfare  and  the Laws of War.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University
Press, p. 74.
54 See  Schmitt,  M.  and  Vihul,  L.  (eds.).  (2017)  Tallinn  Manual  2.0  on the International  Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 125.
55 See UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International  Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 131 (Commentary to Article 50,
paragraph  1).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
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rather  than the Tallinn  Manual’s.  Moreover,  the ICJ  explicitly  noted  in its
Nicaragua judgment, that
“a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity [as an armed attack] cannot […]
produce  any  entitlement  to take  [collective]  countermeasures  involving
the use of force.”57
Admittedly, however, the opinion that forcible countermeasures are lawful
was only shared by the minority of the experts of the Tallinn Manual.58
Second, Article 52(1)(b) ILC Articles foresees a notification requirement
of the injured  state  to the responsible  state  that  it  decides  to take
countermeasures  and  a requirement  to offer  negotiations  with  the latter
state.59 In case  of urgent  countermeasures,  however,  there  is  no  such
requirement according to Article 52(2) ILC Articles.60 The question is what
constitutes  urgency in that context. France seems to interpret  urgency quite
broadly, arguing that urgent countermeasures may be taken whenever
 “there is a need to protect [the victim state’s] rights”.61
56 Rather to the contrary,  see Ministère des Armées.  (2019)  Droit International Appliqué  Aux
Operations Dans Le Cyberespace.  Paris,  p. 8.  [online] Available  from: https://www.defense.
gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/
communique_la-france-s-engage-a-promouvoir-un-cyberespace-stable-fonde-sur-la-
confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-international [Accessed 4 February 2020]; Wright, J. (2018)
Cyber  and  International  Law  in the 21st  Century.  London.  [online] Available  from:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century
[Accessed  20  August  2020];  Government  of Estonia.  (2019)  President  of the Republic
at the Opening  of CyCon  2019.  Tallinn.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.president.ee/
en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-
2019/index.html  [Accessed  20  August  2020];  Government  of the Netherlands.  (2019)
Appendix  to the Letter  to the Parliament  on the International  Legal  Order  in Cyberspace.
The Hague,  p. 7.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.government.nl/documents/
parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-
order-in-cyberspace [Accessed 4 February 2020].
57 Judgment of 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 14, p. 117, paragraph
249; UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 132 (Commentary to Article 50,
paragraph  5).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instrument/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
58 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 125–126, paragraph 12.
59 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10. Article 52(1)(b). [online] Available from:
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf  
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
60 Op. cit., Article 52(2) notes:  “Notwithstanding paragraph 1 (b), the injured State may take such
urgent countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights.”
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The Tallinn Manual 2.0 notes that
“if notification of intent to take a countermeasure would likely render that
measure meaningless”
there  is  also no  requirement  to notify.  The Group of Experts  argued that
such a case, despite not being urgent  per se, would be analogous to urgent
countermeasures.62 Also,  the majority  of experts  rejected  the existence
of a requirement  to offer  negotiation  before  conducting
the countermeasure.63
Another  important  aspect  to bear  in mind  is  the proportionality
requirement as stipulated in Article  51 ILC Articles.  It poses an “essential
limit” for states wishing to react to an internationally wrongful act through
countermeasures.64 The proportionality  requirement  is  particularly
important to consider when a victim state is taking countermeasures against
a state  which  has  violated its  due diligence  obligation  but  did  not  itself
commit  the internationally  wrongful  act  (concerning  the debate  whether
the due  diligence  principle  poses  a legal  obligation  on states,  see  above).
Article 51 ILC Articles clearly stipulates in this context that both the gravity
of the act  and  the rights  in question  need to be  taken into  account  when
assessing which countermeasure would be proportionate to the act. Thus,
the way a state is  able to react to the violation of a state’s obligation to act
with  due  diligence  obviously  differs  compared  to a state’s  reaction
to a violation of e.g. the prohibition of the use of force or intervention. 
Closely  linked  to the proportionality  requirement  is  the view
of the legality of collective countermeasures. Estonia has recently voiced its
opinion  that  it  believes  that  states  may  also  take  such  collective
61 Ministère des Armées. (2019) Droit International Appliqué Aux Operations Dans Le Cyberespace.
Paris,  p. 8.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/
communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique_la-france-s-engage-a-
promouvoir-un-cyberespace-stable-fonde-sur-la-confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-
international [Accessed 4 February 2020].
62 See  Schmitt,  M.  and  Vihul,  L.  (eds.).  (2017)  Tallinn  Manual  2.0  on the International  Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 120, para. 12.
63 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–121, para. 13.
64 Cf.  UN International Law Commission.  (2001)  Report  of the International  Law Commission,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries.
UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 134 (Commentary to Article 51,
paragraph  1).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
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countermeasures65 –  something  the ILC Articles  have left  open to debate.
France, to the contrary, notes that
“[c]ollective  countermeasures  are  not  authorised,  which  rules  out
the possibility  of France  taking  such  measures  in response
to an infringement of another State’s rights.”66
The passage  of the Nicaragua judgment  cited  above  on the illegality
of collective  countermeasures  involving  the use  of force  may  also  point
in a similar direction.67 One could, however, interpret this statement as only
relating  to the question  of use  of force,  while  leaving  the legality
of collective countermeasures below the threshold of force unanswered.  It
also cannot be ruled out that states may agree on a new cyber-related rule
which might allow collective countermeasures solely in the cyber context. 
According  to a statement  made  at the second  substantive  session
of the OEWG  in February  2020,  Austria  believes  that  the “severe  cyber
operation” targeting the country violated the rule of sovereignty and that
a “state may seek reparation under the law of state responsibility” – if the act is
attributable to a state.68 Austria also noted that a
“target state may […] react through proportionate countermeasures”.69 
External sources revealed that a team of hackers managed to end the attacks
within the IT system of the Foreign Ministry by putting the offending group
in the “defensive”.70 Luckily,  the hacking group only managed to get  into
the mail  server  and not  into  the intranet  of the Ministry,  making it  easier
65 Government of Estonia. (2019) President of the Republic at the Opening of CyCon 2019. Tallinn.
[online] Available  from:  https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-
president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html  [Accessed  20  August
2020].
66 Ministère des Armées. (2019) Droit International Appliqué Aux Operations Dans Le Cyberespace.
Paris,  p. 7.  [online] Available  from:  https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/
communiques/communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique_la-france-s-engage-a-
promouvoir-un-cyberespace-stable-fonde-sur-la-confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-
international [Accessed 4 February 2020].
67 Cf.  Judgment  of 27  June  1986,  Case  Concerning  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities in  and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 14, para. 249.
68 Government  of Austria.  (2020)  OEWG  on Developments  in the Field  of Information  and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Statement by Austria on International
Law.  New  York,  p. 1  (delivered  on 11  February  at the second  substantive  session
of the OEWG).
69 Ibid.
70 Moechel,  E.  (2020)  Cyberhusarenstück  Schlug  Angreifer  im  Außenministerium.  [blog  entry]
23 February. Radio FM4. Available from: https://fm4.orf.at/stories/2999042/ 
[Accessed 20 August 2020].
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to kick the offenders out of the system.71 Unfortunately, there is no further
information  as Austrian  institutions  declined  to comment.72 Based
on the existing  information,  however,  it  can be  assumed that  the defence
against  the hacking  group  stayed  below  the use  of force.  It  also  seemed
proportional  and aimed at ceasing the initial  wrongful conduct.  There is,
unfortunately,  no information,  whether the defenders  had to intrude into
the networks  of another  state  or whether  the defence  stayed  within
the Austrian  IT  systems.  If the latter  case  is  true,  the “hackback”
by Austrian  technicians  could  even  have  been  a lawful  retorsion  and  it
could be assumed that Austria would have been capable to even go further
than what it did.
To conclude, it is safe to say that there currently is an active debate about
what  states  are  allowed  and  not  allowed  to do  when  undertaking
a “hackback” in the form of a countermeasure. But not only are there open
questions  with  respect  to countermeasures –  also  the traditional  views
on the right to self-defence raises new questions in the cyber context (even
though  the possibility  to react  in self-defence  is  very  limited).  Therefore,
hackback as self-defence will be addressed in the next chapter.
4. HACKBACK AS SELF-DEFENCE
A “hackback”  could  also  be  a lawful  exercise  of the right  of self-defence.
The right of self-defence is  enshrined in Article  51 UN Charter and states
the following: 
“Nothing  in the present  Charter  shall  impair  the inherent  right
of individual  or collective  self-defence  if an armed  attack  occurs  against
a Member  of the United  Nations,  until  the Security  Council  has  taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. 
This means that a lawful exercise of the right of self-defence must meet
the following conditions:73
1. it must be a response to an armed attack;




73 See Greenwood, C. (2011) Self-Defence. In: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.). Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (online edition), paragraph 8.
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3. it  must be reported to the Security Council  and must cease when
the Security  Council  has  taken  “measures  necessary  to maintain
international peace and security”.
Another precondition that is, according to the present authors, implied is
that  of attribution  to a state:74 If a cyber  operation  reaches  the threshold
of an armed  attack,  the present  authors  argue  that  under  current
international law it would also be necessary to attribute the attack to a state
in order to exercise  the right  to self-defence.  While  the ICJ  has  repeatedly
found that only acts attributable to a state can constitute an armed attack,
this  view has been questioned by some scholars.75 Zemanek,  for  example,
argues  that  the ICJ  would  disregard  resolutions  adopted  by the Security
Council  after  the terrorist  attacks  of  “9/11”,  especially  resolutions  1368
(2001) and  1373  (2001).  According  to Zemanek,  these  resolutions  would
implicitly  recognize  the terrorist  attack  as an “armed  attack”  in the sense
of Article 51 UN Charter.76
However, the ICJ has since reiterated its position and stated that
“Article 51 of the Charter  […] recognizes the existence of an inherent right
of self-defence  in the case  of armed  attack  by one  State  against  another
State”.77
In addition, the notion to extend the right to self-defence against non-state
actors has been criticized within the literature.78
74 See section 2.
75 See Zemanek, K. (2013) Armed Attack. In: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.). Max Planck Encyclopedia
of  Public  International  Law (online  edition),  paragraph  15;  Tsagourias,  N.  (2012)  Cyber
Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 17,
p. 241.
76 Zemanek,  K.  (2013)  Armed Attack.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum (ed.).  Max Planck  Encyclopedia
of Public  International Law (online edition), paragraph 15; Judgment of 19 December 2005,
Armed  Activities  on the Territory  of the Congo  (Democratic  Republic  of  the Congo  v. Uganda)
(Separate Opinion Judge Simma), ICJ Reports 334, paragraph 11.
77 Advisory  Opinion  of 9  July  2004,  Legal  Consequences  of the Construction  of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 136, paragraph 139; see also Judgment of 19
December 2005, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Uganda) (Merits), ICJ Reports 168, paragraphs 146, 160.
78 Gray, C. (2018) International Law and the Use of Force. 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University
Press,  p. 210;  Vidmar,  J.  (2017)  The Use  of Force  as a Plea  of Necessity.  American  Journal
of International  Law  Unbound,  111,  p. 302;  see  also  Ministère  des  Armées.  (2019)  Droit
International Appliqué Aux Operations Dans Le Cyberespace. Paris, p. 8. [online] Available from:
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/communiques-du-ministere-
des-armees/communique_la-france-s-engage-a-promouvoir-un-cyberespace-stable-fonde-
sur-la-confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-international  [Accessed  4  February  2020];  see,
however, Murphy, S. D. (2005) Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse
Dixit from the ICJ?. American Journal of International Law, 99 (1).
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As Gray,  for example, points out, even if self-defence against non-state
actors was permissible,  it would still  not allow a state to infringe the host
state’s rights.79
An armed  attack  constitutes  a “use  of force”  within  the meaning
of Article 2(4) UN Charter. The ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case that “armed
attacks” have to be distinguished as
“the most grave forms of the use of force from other less grave forms”.80
Self-defence  is  permissible  only  in response  to such  armed  attacks.
The ICJ’s original emphasis on differentiating an armed attack from a “mere
frontier  incident”  has  also  been  criticized  in the literature.81 However,
the ICJ has since clarified that a single attack can also constitute an armed
attack.82 Nevertheless, it is obvious that not every use of force automatically
justifies  actions  of self-defence.83 To determine  whether  a use  of force
amounts  to an armed  attack,  the ICJ  considers  the “scale  and  effects”
of an attack.84 The type of weapon used to reach the threshold of an attack is
irrelevant:  “armed attack” in the sense  of Article  51 includes  both kinetic
and “cyber”weapons.85
According to Constantinou, 
“[an] armed  attack  implies  an act  or the beginning  of a series  of acts
of armed force of considerable magnitude and intensity (ie scale) which have
as their consequence (ie effects) the infliction of substantial destruction upon
important  elements  of the target  State  namely,  upon its  people,  economic
and  security  infrastructure,  destruction  of aspects  of its  governmental
79 See  Gray,  C.  (2018)  International  Law  and  the Use  of Force.  4th  edition.  Oxford:  Oxford
University Press, p. 210, with further references.
80 Judgment of 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 14.
81 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 341.
82 Judgment  of 6  November  2003,  Case  Concerning  Oil  Platforms  (Islamic  Republic  of Iran
v. United States  of America)  (Merits),  ICJ  Reports  161, paragraphs 57, 61;  Schmitt,  M. and
Vihul,  L.  (eds.).  (2017)  Tallinn  Manual  2.0  on the International  Law  Applicable  to Cyber
Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 342.
83 Greenwood, C.  (2011)  Self-Defence.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum (ed.).  Max Planck  Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (online edition), paragraph 12; Zemanek, K. (2013) Armed Attack.
In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum  (ed.).  Max  Planck  Encyclopedia  of Public  International  Law (online
edition), paragraph 7.
84 Judgment of 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 14, para. 195.
85 Woltag,  J.  (2015)  Cyber  Warfare.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum  (ed.).  Max  Planck  Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (online edition), paragraphs 8f.
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authority, ie its political independence, as well as damage to or deprivation
of its physical element namely, its territory”.86
While this definition (or other similar ones) could just as well be applied
to cyber operations, the Tallinn Group of Experts  could agree only to a very
basic outline. According to them,
“a cyber operation that seriously injures or kills a number of persons or that
causes  significant  damage  to,  or destruction  of,  property  would  satisfy
the scale and effects requirement”,
whereas
“acts  of cyber  intelligence  gathering  and  cyber  theft,  as well  as cyber
operations that involve brief or periodic interruption of non-essential cyber
services, do not qualify as armed attacks”.87
The Tallinn Group of Experts could, however, not agree on whether cyber
operations can be considered “armed attacks” if they do not result in injury,
death,  damage,  or destruction,  but  nonetheless  have  extensive  negative
effects.88 It is generally difficult to determine the scale and effects of cyber
operations, since cyber attacks do not always manifest in the “analogous”
world and if they do, they only have an “indirect” impact.89
In view  of the immense  harm  that  a failure  of “critical  infrastructure”
could potentially have, some focus on whether the target of the attack can
be  qualified  as such,  in order  to assess  whether  an armed  attack  has
occurred.90 However, this is problematic for two reasons. First, there is no
uniform definition of “critical infrastructure” and different understandings
exist  within  each  national  legal  framework.  Second,  the two  concepts
86 Constantinou,  A.  (2000)  The Right  of Self-Defence  under  Customary  International  Law  and
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Ant. N. Sakkoulas, p. 64; Zemanek, K. (2013) Armed
Attack.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum  (ed.). Max  Planck  Encyclopedia  of Public  International  Law.
(online edition), paragraph 9.
87 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 341.
88 Op. cit., p. 342.
89 Woltag,  J.  (2015)  Cyber  Warfare.  In:  Rüdiger  Wolfrum  (ed.).  Max  Planck  Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (online edition), paragraph 13.
90 Ministère des Armées. (2019) Droit International Appliqué Aux Operations Dans Le Cyberspace.
Paris.  [online] Available from: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/
communiques-du-ministere-des-armees/communique_la-france-s-engage-a-promouvoir-
un-cyberespace-stable-fonde-sur-la-confiance-et-le-respect-du-droit-international  
[Accessed 4 February 2020].
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of “critical  infrastructure”  and  “armed  attack”  do  not  entirely  correlate.
The former issue could be solved in the near future. There are efforts within
the European  Union,  for  example,  to harmonize  the concept  of critical
infrastructure and measures that have to be taken to ensure their security.
In this  regard  Council  Directive  2008/114/EC91 and the Directive  on Security
of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive)92 should be mentioned. 
Council Directive 2008/114/EC defines critical infrastructure as
“an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential
for  the maintenance  of vital  societal  functions,  health,  safety,  security,
economic  or social  well-being  of people,  and  the disruption  or destruction
of which  would  have  a significant  impact  in a Member  State  as a result
of the failure to maintain those functions”.93
This means that whether certain infrastructure can be considered “critical”,
depends on the individual circumstances of each Member State. 
The NIS Directive especially  concerns network security for  “operators
of essential services” and “digital service providers”. Essential services are
therein determined within specific economic sectors (e.g. energy, transport,
health)  as being  essential  for  the maintenance  of “critical  societal  and/or
economic activities” and that an incident would have “significant disruptive
effects on the provision of that service”.94 In Austria, the NIS Directive has been
implemented by the NIS Act.95
Regarding  the latter  issue  (namely  the fact  that  the two  concepts
of “armed attack” and “critical infrastructure” do not correlate): There are
possible  scenarios  where  a critical  infrastructure  is  targeted,  but  where
91 Council  Directive  2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation
of European  Critical  Infrastructures  and  the Assessment  of the Need  to Improve  their
Protection. Official Journal of the European Union (2008/L-345/75), 23 December.
92 Directive  (EU)  2016/1148  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 6  July  2016
Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information
Systems Across the Union. Official Journal of the European Union (2016/L-194/01) 19 July.
93 Council  Directive  2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation
of European  Critical  Infrastructures  and  the Assessment  of the Need  to Improve  their
Protection. Official Journal of the European Union (2008/L-345/75), 23 December. Article 2(a).
94 Article  5(2)  Directive  2016/1148/EU  also  requires  the service  to depend  on network  and
informations  systems,  Directive  (EU)  2016/1148  of the European  Parliament  and
of the Council of 6 July 2016 Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security
of Network and Information Systems Across the Union. Official Journal of the European Union
(2016/L-194/01), 19 July.
95 Federal Act on Ensuring a High Level of Security of Network and Information Systems 2018
(Netz-  und  Informationssystemsicherheitsgesetz –  NISG)  Austrian  Federal  Law  Gazette  I
No. 111/2018.
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the operation  is  not  severe  enough  as to reach  the scale  and  effects
of an armed  attack.  On the other  hand,  a cyber  attack  that  leads
to the destruction of e.g. an apartment building (which does not constitute
“critical  infrastructure”)  could  be  considered  to reach  the threshold
of an armed  attack.  This  means  that  the use  of the terms  “critical
infrastructure” or “essential service provider” could be more confusing than
helpful in determining whether an armed attack has occurred. 
Having  said  this,  given  the reportedly  low  scale  and  effect
of the operation against the Austrian Foreign Ministry in January 2020, it can
be ruled out that such a cyber operation amounted to an armed attack, even
if the Ministry  decided to classify such as a use of force and even though it
falls within the scope of the NIS Act. It can, however, not be ruled out that
a future  attack  could  reach  the threshold  of an armed  attack,  especially
if the cyber  operation  was  aimed  at destroying  infrastructure  or causing
(“considerable”) damage. In that case, it might be easier to argue for a right
of self-defence if critical infrastructure, such as the Austrian Foreign Ministry,
was the target.
We can therefore conclude that the cyber operation against the Austrian
Foreign Ministry did not entitle Austria to “hackback” with a forceful strike
in  self-defence,  as only  “the most  grave  forms  of the use  of force”96 are
qualified  as armed attacks.  Even if –  for  some reason –  it  did,  the attack
would, in accordance with the ICJ case law, have to be attributed to a state
in order  to take  measures  of self-defence  against  the attacker  without
consent of the host state. 
5. HACKBACK BASED ON THE PLEA OF NECESSITY 
States may rely on the plea of necessity during a hackback, which is quite
different from the other legal bases mentioned before (countermeasure, self-
-defence). The plea of necessity, as set forth in Article 25 of the ILC Articles,
is not dependent on the prior conduct of the injured state.97 In the authors’
opinion,  the most  important  difference  to the two  legal  bases  mentioned
96 Judgment of 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ICJ Reports 14.
97 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 80  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  2).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020]: the "injured state" being the state
against which measures on the basis of necessity are taken.
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above is that no attribution to a state is required.98 It “merely” suffices that
the danger emanates from that state’s territory. This section will elaborate
on the extent to which a plea of necessity allows a hackback. 
For  a state  to be  able  to invoke  necessity,  the conditions –  narrowly
defined in Article 2599 – must be met. These are (1) the grave danger either
to the essential  interests  of the state  or of the international  community
as a whole and (2)  that the conduct in question does not seriously impair
an essential  interest  of the state  or states  towards  which  the obligation
exists, or of the international community as a whole.100
Even if these conditions are met, necessity may not be invoked by a state
as a ground for  precluding wrongfulness  if (a) the international  obligation
in question  excludes  the possibility  of invoking  necessity;  or (b) the State
has contributed to the situation of necessity.101
In the Commentary to the ILC Articles,  the ILC cited  various decisions
and cases in which the plea of necessity was put forward (or its  existence
at least not denied) as justification for the fact that the plea of necessity is
part of the applicable customary international law (lex lata).102 Even though
critical voices in the literature have argued that Article 25 of the ILC Articles
should have been seen to be merely an aid to orientation and should not
have  been  adopted  verbatim,103 it  cannot  be  denied  that  the concept
of necessity exists in customary international law. On the other hand, it  is
98 Ibid. See also Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law  Applicable  to Cyber  Operations.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  Rule  25,
paragraph  10;  Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-Defense  and  Countermeasures:  A Critical
Assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, p. 1621;
note,  as already highlighted above,  that  some scholars argue that attribution is  also not
required for the exercise of self-defence.
99 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally  Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 80  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  1).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
100 Op. cit., Article 25(1); on necessity and its applicability in a cyber context see also: Vidmar, J.
(2017) The Use of Force as a Plea of Necessity. American Journal of International Law Unbound,
111,  p. 302;  Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-Defense  and  Countermeasures:  A Critical
Assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, p. 1619;
Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 26.
101 Op. cit., Article 25(2).
102 Op. cit. pp. 80ff (Commentary to Article 25, paragraphs 3ff).
103 Sloane, R. D. (2012) On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility.
American Journal of International Law, 106 (3), p. 447; see also Schaller, C. (2017) Beyond Self-
-Defense and Countermeasures: A Critical Assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception
of Necessity.  Texas  Law  Review,  95,  p. 1630  [questioning  state  practice  regarding
the requirement “that the action must not seriously impair the essential interests of other States“].
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also  apparent  that  the precise  nature  and  scope  of the plea  of necessity
remain controversial.104
What amounts to an “essential interest” is not unilaterally defined and
therefore vague.105 According to the ILC, the extent to which a given interest
is  “essential”  depends  on all  the circumstances  and  therefore  cannot  be
prejudged.  It  extends  to particular  interests  of the state  and  its  people,
as well as of the international community as a whole.106
As has  been  elaborated  in the context  of self-defence  (see  above),
the designation  of certain  parts  of a state’s  infrastructure  as “critical
infrastructure” might  be  suggestive  of their  characterisation of an interest
as essential,  but  not  determinative.107 Schaller  argues  that  an essential
interest within the meaning of Article 25 and Rule 26 of the Tallinn Manual
should  not  be  narrowed  down  solely  to the concept  of critical
infrastructure.108 As the Tallinn Group of Experts agreed, an essential interest 
“is  most  clearly  implicated  when  critical  infrastructure  is  targeted
in a manner that  may have a severe negative impact  on a state’s security,
economy, public health, safety, or environment”.109
Similar  to the determination  whether  a cyber  operation  reaches
the threshold of an armed attack, the involvement of critical  infrastructure
can  be  an indicative  but  not  a decisive  factor  in determining  if essential
interests are in danger. 
104 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 83  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  13).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf  [Accessed  20  August  2020];  Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond Self-
-Defense and Countermeasures: A Critical Assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception
of Necessity.  Texas  Law Review,  95,  p. 1636  [who promotes  a necessity  regime for  cyber
incidents, because the “contours of the concept of necessity as applied in the cyber context are not
yet sufficiently clear to dispel concerns [of their abuse]“].
105 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 26, paragraph 2.
106 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 83  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  15).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
107 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 26, paragraph 2.
108 Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-Defense  and  Countermeasures:  A Critical  Assessment
of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, p. 1632.
109 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.) (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 26, paragraph 5.
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Similar  to self-defence,  however,  focusing  on the term  “critical
infrastructure” could lead to some confusion (see above). Particularly with
regard to necessity, one has to be aware of circular reasoning. Since critical
infrastructure is defined as concerning vital or essential interests of the state
and/or  the public  and that  damage  of this  infrastructure  could  seriously
harm these interests, one cannot argue that there is a state of necessity just
on the basis that a cyber operation is targeting critical infrastructure. 
The examples  given in the Tallinn  Manual  illustrate  (according  to most
of the experts)  situations  in which  essential  interests  are  gravely  and
imminently threatened. Such situations would include 
“a cyber-operation that would debilitate the State’s banking system, cause
a dramatic loss of confidence in its stock market, ground flights nation-wide,
halt  all  rail  traffic,  stop  national  pension and other  social  benefits,  alter
national  health  records  in a manner  endangering  the health
of the population, cause a major environmental disaster, shut down a large
electrical  grid,  seriously  disrupt  the national  food  distribution  network,
or shut down the integrated air defence system would provide the basis for
the application of this rule”.110
To invoke the plea of necessity,  such essential  interests of a State must
face a grave and imminent peril. A peril can, in accordance with the expert
group  of the Tallinn  Manual,  be  seen  as “grave”,  when  the threat  is
especially severe, if the interest is interfered with in a fundamental way, like
destroying the interest or rendering it largely dysfunctional.111
With  regard  to the “imminence”  of such  peril,  the Commentary
to the ILC Articles states that such imminence must be
“objectively established and not merely apprehended as possible”,112
and the decision that measures must be taken must be
110 Ibid.
111 Op. cit., Article 25, paragraph 4.
112 UN International Law Commission. (2001)  Report of the International Law Commission, Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally  Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 83  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  15).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
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“clearly  established  on the basis  of the evidence  reasonably  available
at the time”.113
It should not be understood solely as a temporal issue. 
The Tallinn Group of Experts agreed that peril should always be imminent
when the “last window of opportunity” to take action to prevent it is about
to close.114 The last  window  of opportunity  is  familiar  from  the debate
surrounding the right to anticipatory self-defence.115 There, it is argued that
“restrictive  approaches  to imminency  run  counter  to the purposes
animating the right of self-defence”116
and that
“the correct standard for evaluating a preemptive operation must be whether
or not it occurred during the last possible window of opportunity in the face
of an attack that was almost certainly going to occur”.117
One  has  to keep  in mind  that  this  last  window  of opportunity  standard
would  generally  provide  States  with  considerable  leeway  for  action
whether invoking the right to self-defence or the plea of necessity.118 From
its meaning,  the “last window of opportunity” standard should rather be
applied  to test  whether  a certain  measure  is  “the only  way”  to protect
essential interests from a grave and imminent peril, than to test if that peril
is “imminent”. 
In conclusion,  reacting  based  on necessity  remains  an exceptional
measure.119 Therefore, the wrongfulness of measures can only be precluded
on the basis  of necessity,  if they  are –  based  on reasonable  certainty120 –
the only way for  a state to safeguard essential  interests from a grave and
imminent  danger.  When determining  essential  interests,  states  will  most
113 Op. cit., p. 83 (Commentary to Article 25, paragraph 16).
114 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 139.
115 Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-Defense  and  Countermeasures:  A Critical  Assessment
of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, p. 1635.
116 Schmitt,  M.  N.  (2003)  Preemptive  Strategies  in International  Law.  Michigan  Journal
of International  Law,  24 (2),  p. 534;  see  also  references  in Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-
-Defense and Countermeasures: A Critical Assessment of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception
of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, pp. 1619, 1635 (fn. 115).
117 Schmitt,  M.  N.  (2003)  Preemptive  Strategies  in International  Law.  Michigan  Journal
of International Law, 24 (2), p. 535.
118 Schaller,  C.  (2017)  Beyond  Self-Defense  and  Countermeasures:  A Critical  Assessment
of the Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity. Texas Law Review, 95, p. 1635.
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likely resort to their definition of critical infrastructure, although it should
be  kept  in mind  that  necessity  is  not  restricted  to critical  infrastructure.
In addition, the main focus should be to determine 1) if it is a “grave peril”
that  threatens  essential  interests  and  2)  if other  measures  (e.g. [cyber]
diplomacy)  that  do  not  affect  the rights  of other  states  could  be  taken
(arg. “the  only way”).  The present  authors  argue,  however,  that  if a peril
to an essential  interest is  imminent, there might be a lower standard with
regard  to what  is  reasonable  to expect  on the “gravity”  of the attack
if the window  of opportunity  is  about  to close  (e.g. in the moment  before
a malware is inserted to or data is extracted from a critical system). 
So  even  though  the recent  cyber  operation  was  directed  against
the Austrian  Foreign  Ministry  (and  therefore,  arguably,  against  a critical
infrastructure)  it  would not  allow Austria  to react  out  of necessity.  Only
if essential  interests  (like  water  supply,  power  supply  or general  matters
of internal security) are threatened in a way that would render them largely
dysfunctional  would it  be  permissible  to invoke necessity.  Therefore,  not
every cyber operation against networks of critical infrastructure allows for
measures  taken  in necessity,  but  only  those  attacks  that  also  threaten
the essential  interest  that  such  infrastructure  is  “critical”  to maintain.
In other  words:  This  exceptional  rule  should  rather  apply  in cases  like
an imminent  power  outage  (“black-out”)  or other  events  with  grave
consequences  that  similarly  effect  essential  interests  of the state  and/or
the population.
6. CONCLUSION
This  contribution  has demonstrated that  international  law allows certain
ways to react to malicious cyber operations. States can either react through
119 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.). (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  Rule 26, paragraph 17; UN
International  Law  Commission.  (2001)  Report  of the International  Law  Commission,  Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally  Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 80  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  1).  [online]  Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
120 Schmitt, M. and Vihul, L. (eds.) (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Operations.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  Rule 26, paragraph 14; UN
International  Law  Commission.  (2001)  Report  of the International  Law  Commission,  Draft
Articles  on Responsibility  of States  for  Internationally  Wrongful  Acts,  With Commentaries.  UN
GAOR,  53rd  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  10,  UN  Doc.  A/56/10,  p. 83  (Commentary  to Article  25,
paragraph  16).  [online] Available  from:  https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [Accessed 20 August 2020].
2020] E. Schweighofer, I. Brunner, J. Zanol: Malicious Cyber Operations ... 253
countermeasures,  self-defence  or out  of necessity.  The purpose  of this
contribution was to elaborate on these three ways in more detail. 
Austrian  news  reports  and  press  releases  suggest  that  the cyber
operation against the Austrian Foreign Ministry did not cause major damage.
Thus, it most likely cannot be classified as a use of force according to Article
2(4)  UN Charter,  but  it  might  be  severe  enough to constitute  a violation
of Austria’s  sovereignty.  Austria  has  remained  silent  as to the territorial
origins  of the operation.  However,  in case  the whereabouts  are  known,  it
could  also  be  argued  that  the host  state,  from  which  the operation
originated – acted in violation of the due diligence principle. In these cases,
Austria  would  be  permitted  to take  countermeasures  against  the state
to which  the wrongful  conduct  (in the former  instance)  or the negligence
(in the latter instance) could be attributed. Such countermeasures could be
any  type  of activity  aimed  at ceasing  the wrongful  conduct,  as long  as it
does not amount to force and is necessary and proportionate. 
Given the low-level nature of the cyber operation, the possibility to act
in self-defence or out of necessity seems out of question. However, it cannot
be ruled out that Austria (or any other state) may be able to rely on these
measures  in case  it  will  be the  target  of a more  severe  cyber  operation
in the future.
To conclude,  even  when  applying  a more  “traditional”  approach
by applying  existing  customary  international  law  as expressed  in the ILC
Articles  and  by ICJ  case  law,  many  questions  as to what  the concrete
response options are,  remain.  These questions will  likely only be solved
if more  states  come  forward  with  their  national  views  about  how
international  law applies  to cyber operations.  With its  press releases and
statements at UN level, Austria finally entered this discussion. There is no
doubt  that  the cyber  operation  against  the Foreign  Ministry  has  acted
as a stimulus for this debate.
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